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FIVE THOUSAND FEET AND BELOW: THE 
FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY REGULATE 
DEEPWATER OIL PRODUCTION 
TECHNOLOGY 
Mark A. Latham* 
Abstract: Oil and gas production in the Gulf of Mexico is an important 
aspect of our domestic energy strategy, and to successfully obtain oil from 
deep beneath the ocean floor, in thousands of feet of water, an impressive 
array of technology is utilized by the oil and gas industry. One of the many 
lessons learned, however, from the Deepwater Horizon disaster is that this 
technology can present significant risks to human life and the environ-
ment if it fails. This Article presents an overview of the technology used to 
conduct deepwater oil and gas drilling operations, and then examines how 
the failure to adequately regulate this risky technology played a major role 
in the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe. This Article also summarizes the 
actions taken by regulators in response, and questions whether the actions 
taken are sufficient to prevent another deepwater disaster. The Article 
concludes by suggesting a number of other actions for consideration by 
policymakers to reduce the risks associated with producing oil from tens of 
thousands of feet beneath the ocean’s floor. 
Introduction 
 With current domestic oil output becoming less productive and 
less reliable,1 petroleum engineers are increasingly searching at depths 
far beneath the ocean’s surface for potential new deposits of recover-
able oil.2 Today, oil companies are conducting exploration and produc-
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 As the Deepwater Horizon spill demonstrates, this new frontier of 
oil exploration and production has successfully located recoverable oil 
deposits thousands of feet below the ocean’s surface.4 The oil pursued 
through deepwater drilling not only lies below thousands of feet of wa-
ter, but also rests in deposits tens of thousands of feet beneath the 
ocean floor.5 In the United States such d
p uction activities are largely confined to the Gulf of Mexico,6 the 
site of the Deepwater Horizon disaster.7 
 Tapping into deepwater oil deposits involves remarkable and ever-
increasingly sophisticated technology to first locate potential oil re-
serves thousands of feet below the ocean’s surface.8 Once a promising 
source of oil beneath the ocean’s surface is located, an equally miracu-
                                                                                                               
3 See id. at 9 (“In 2007, a record number of 15 rigs were drilling for oil and gas in water 
depths of 5,000 ft (1,524 m) or more in the [Gulf of Mexico]. At least 13 new drilling rigs 
are being built and contracted for use in the ultra-deepwater Gulf . . . they will be capable 
of operating in water depths up to 12,000 ft (3,658 m) and drilling to total depths of 
40,000 ft (12,192m).”). 
4 See id. at 10 tbl.2. 
5 Joel K. Bourne, Jr., The Deep Dilemma, Nat’l Geographic, Oct. 2010, at 40, 44 (“BP’s 
Macondo well, in about 5,000 feet of water and reaching another 13,000 feet beneath the 
seafloor, wasn’t particularly deep. The industry has drilled in 10,000 feet of water and to 
depths of 35,000 feet—the latter a world record just set last year by the Deepwater Horizon in 
another BP field in the Gulf.”). 
6 See Minerals Mgmt. Serv., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Deep Water: Where the 
Energy Is 2 (2004), available at http://www.boemre.gov/Assets/PressConference11152004/ 
MSGlossySingle_110404.pdf (“With declining production from its near-shore, shallow waters, 
energy companies have focused their attention on oil and gas resources in water depths of 
1,000 feet and beyond. Their progress in developing these resources has made the Gulf of 
Mexico the focal point of deep water oil and gas exploration and production in the world.”). 
7 See Campbell Robertson, 11 Remain Missing After Oil Rig Explodes off Louisiana; 17 Are 
Hurt, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 2010, at A13. 
8 See John T. Cuddington & Diana L. Moss, Technological Change, Depletion, and the U.S. 
Petroleum Industry, 91 Am. Econ. Rev. 1135, 1136 (2001) (“Technological advances such as 
three-dimensional seismic techniques, polycrystalline diamond compact drill bits, horizon-
tal drilling, and offshore platforms capable of operating in hostile, deep-water environ-
ments are widely acknowledged to have had significant impact on [oil exploration and 
development] . . . .”). 
9 See Jad Mouawad & Barry Meier, Risk-Taking Rises to New Levels as Oil Rigs in Gulf Drill 
Deeper, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 2010, at A1 (“[T]he Perdido platform is a vast hub that can 
drill and pump oil from wells across 30 miles of ocean floor. Below it is a subsea cityscape 
of pumps, pipes, valves, manifolds, wellheads and blowout preventers—all painted a bright 
yellow so as to be visible to the floodlights of the remote-controlled submarines that main-
tain it.”). 
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modern day engineering feats that have allowed for the discovery and 
extraction of oil from so deep below the ocean. 
 However, the several-months-long Deepwater Horizon oil gusher 
also taught us that this technology has significant limitations. When this 
miracle of complex technology fails, there is no readily available and 
reliable technology to promptly abate a catastrophic, uncontrolled flow 
of oil.10 This fundamental technological shortcoming is additionally 
problematic because at the depths deepwater drilling takes place, the 
ocean is utterly inhospitable to direct human intervention when disas-
ter strikes.11 
 While a confluence of factors from both industry and regulators 
led to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill,12 there is little doubt that one of 
the root causes of this catastrophe was a failure of technology. The last 
line of defense to prevent a spill of this magnitude from occurring at a 
deep well—a device known as a blowout preventer—utterly failed.13 
Deepwater oil, it turns out, presents serious adverse consequences in 
the event of a catastrophic technological failure. 
 Without the astonishing technology required to find and extract 
oil from thousands of feet below the ocean’s floor, deepwater would be 
off limits for oil drilling. We do posses such technology, however, and 
the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe properly raises questions concern-
ing the sufficiency of federal government oversight, particularly the 
adequacy of regulation over the complex technology utilized in deep-
water to extract oil. Indeed, as the events evolved concerning the 
Deepwater Horizon spill, the agency then responsible for oversight of 
virtually all aspects of deepwater exploration and production, the Min-
erals Management Services (MMS), came under harsh scrutiny, and 
any claim it may have had as an effective regulatory body shattered.14 
                                                                                                                      
 
10 See id. 
11 See id. (“[B]ecause the wells are deeper than human divers can go, oil companies must 
rely on remote-controlled submarines to maintain their equipment or perform repairs.”). 
12 See Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drill-
ing, Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling, at vii 
(2011) [hereinafter BP Commission Report]. 
13 Steven Mufson & David A. Fahrenthold, Flaws in Key Oil Rig Device: Harsh Review in 
House, Wash. Post, May 13, 2010, at A01; Katie Howell, BP Should Have Shutdown Doomed 
Rig Weeks Before Explosion, Regulator Says, Greenwire, July 20, 2010, available at http://www. 
eenews.net/Greenwire/2010/07/20/archive/5. 
14 Katie Howell, Panel Faults MMS’s Funding Woes, Lack of Political Support, Greenwire, 
Oct. 13, 2010, available at http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/2010/10/13/archive/3 (“The 
presidential panel investigating the BP PLC oil spill said today that federal offshore-drilling 
regulators’ lack of resources and political backing contributed to the government’s failure to 
properly oversee the oil and gas industry.”). In a prior investigation of MMS and its regula-
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Consequently, not too long after the magnitude of the disaster occur-
ring in the Gulf of Mexico became evident, the Secretary of the Inte-
rior, Kenneth Salazar, promptly fired the head of MMS and completely 
restructured the agency.15 
I. Deepwater Technology Overview 
 Among the first deepwater oil production efforts in the Gulf of 
Mexico was Placid Oil’s attempts in 1984 to recover oil from more than 
1500 feet beneath the surface.16 Production results were less than satis-
factory, so the wells were eventually abandoned.17 This failed effort at 
production nonetheless marked a major technological advancement, 
since it was the first time that a floating platform was used in an effort 
to retrieve oil from the deep.18 Following Placid’s attempt at deepwater 
production, the technology associated with offshore oil exploration 
and production quickly advanced, and opened the Gulf of Mexico as a 
feasible source of oil.19 
A. Locating Deepwater Oil Deposits 
 Locating oil thousands of feet beneath the surface of the ocean re-
quires a combination of technical know-how, complex technology, and 
luck. At this exploratory stage, perhaps no technology is more impor-
tant than three-dimensional seismic technology,20 which relies upon 
sound waves transmitted by specially equipped vessels to produce a 
                                                                                                                      
tion of the oil and gas industry, the Inspector General’s Office for the Department of Interior 
found a wide range of troubling ethical issues between MMS regulators and industry. See 
generally Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Investigative Re-
port: Island Operating Company et al. (2010). 
15 See generally U.S. Sec’y of the Interior, Order No. 3302, Change of the Name of the 
Minerals Management Service to the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, 
and Enforcement ( June 18, 2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/loader. 
cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=35872. 
16 William L. Leffler et al., Deepwater Petroleum Exploration & Production: 
A Nontechnical Guide 30 (2003). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 See id. at 31–34 for a summary of how advances in technology, coupled with a better 
understanding of subsurface geology, led to boom in deepwater oil exploration and pro-
duction. 
20 Id. at 40 (“Seismic data, especially 3D data, is one of the handful of vital enablers 
that has made deepwater exploration so rewarding. No one ever knows what will turn up 
when the drillbit hits total depth, but seismic data provides a quantum leap in improving 
probability of success before the well is drilled. With deepwater wells running up to $100 
million, that’s important.”). 
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three-dimensional record of the subsurface geology.21 This three-
dimensional record is then scrutinized by a variety of scientists for geo-
logical features strongly suggestive of the presence of oil.22 In describing 
Chevron’s seismic hunt for oil in the deep, one reporter noted that the 
company: 
[D]eployed ships that cruised through the Gulf, popping off 
air guns—underwater cannons that emit a gigantic burp into 
the ocean, bouncing sound waves off under water rock forma-
tions. Hydrophones (aquatic microphones) tethered to the 
vessels recorded the response, taking in hundreds of thou-
sands of recordings simultaneously. These allowed the com-
pany to determine the composition and shape of the rocks 
below.23 
If the data retrieved from seismic technology is indicative of the likely 
presence of oil, then the next step is to drill a preliminary well, referred 
to as a “wildcat,”24 to confirm whether there is oil. 
B. Drilling the Production Well 
 Putting a production well in deepwater is an incredibly challenging 
endeavor: “[D]rilling a well in 1500 ft of water is comparable to standing 
on top of the Sears Tower trying to stick a long straw in a bottle of Coke 
sitting on South Wacker Drive.”25 A reporter related that “[b]uilding an 
oil well is like building a ship in an opaque bottle, threading massive 
pipes and intricate tools through a dark, narrow hole.”26 In order to ac-
complish such a near impossible feat, a variety of sophisticated, techno-
logically complex drilling platforms are available,27 which allow opera-
tors to reach oil at depths greater than 25,000 feet beneath the sea 
floor.28 
 Because the oil found beneath deepwater is under tremendous 
pressure, “[p]ressure control sits at the top of the list of worries for the 
                                                                                                                      
21 Id. at 41–43. 
22 Leffler et al., supra note 16, at 46. 
23 Amanda Griscom Little, Oil From The Deep, Wired, Sept. 21, 2007, at 110, 114–17. 
24 Leffler et al., supra note 16, at 46–48. 
25 Id. at 57–58. 
26 Eric Nalder, Disaster in the Gulf: Despite Fatal Blowouts, Changes Come Slowly, Hous. 
Chron., July 20, 2010, at A1. 
27 Leffler et al., supra note 16, at 57. 
28 Id. at 55. The Deepwater Horizon well reached 13,000 feet below the floor of the 
Gulf of Mexico. Bourne, supra note 5, at 44. 
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drilling engineer.”29 To keep well pressure under control, a special 
heavy fluid, drilling mud,30 is injected through the drillpipe and pre-
vents oil and gas from surging uncontrolled through the well.31 Once 
the well is completed, the drilling mud is replaced with a brine solution 
that maintains well control.32 
 Another step taken to control pressure involves pumping cement 
into the casing once it is in place.33 In this step “cement is pumped 
down the casing and at the bottom it is forced into the annulus, the 
space between the casing and the rock.”34 As a final pre-production 
seal, a cement plug is also placed in the well.35 
C. Recovering Oil from the Well 
 Once the well is in place, the next general phase is production— 
obtaining oil from the well for refining into a variety of petroleum 
products such as gasoline, aviation fuel, or diesel fuel. Production, too, 
involves incredibly complex technology on a massive scale.36 Because 
the water depth can exceed the reach of fixed platform systems, float-
ing systems predominate in deepwater production operations.37 These 
floating production systems are often coupled with subsea technology 
in a type of hub-and-spoke arrangement, consisting of a production 
platform connected to several wells through miles of piping.38 Once 
recovered, the oil is then transported through a network of undersea 
pipelines to an onshore refinery for final processing.39 
                                                                                                                      
29 Leffler et al., supra note 16, at 58. 
30 See John K. Borchardt, Avoiding the Blowout, Mechanical Engineering, Aug. 2010, 
at 40, 40. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Casing is the tubing that the oil flows through during production. Leffler et al., 
supra note 16, at 61. 
34 See Borchardt supra note 30, at 40. 
35 Id. at 41. 
36 See Matthew Philips, Journey to the Center of the Earth, Newsweek (Mar. 12, 2010), http:// 
www.newsweek.com/2010/03/11/journey-to-the-center-of-the-earth.html ("Chevron's Tahiti 
[ultra-deepwater production] platform, about 190 miles offshore, first appears as a speck in 
open water. Even up close, its size is deceiving. A three-level structure sits above the surface, 
but its 555-foot hull is entirely submerged. At 714 feet tall and weighing more than 80 million 
pounds, Tahiti is the equivalent of a 70-story skyscraper floating in 4,000 feet of water.”). 
37 See Leffler et al., supra note 16, at 90. 
38 See id. at 97, 107–19 (describing the subsea systems used in deepwater oil and gas 
drilling). 
39 See Richardson et al., supra note 2, at 54, 56–57. 
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D. The Pressure Control Technology of Last Resort: The Blowout Preventer 
 In the event that drilling mud or cement fails to control well pres-
sure, then the most critical piece of pressure control technology is the 
blowout preventer.40 A blowout preventer has “three or more sets of hy-
draulic devices . . . [and t]he first line of defense is the Hydril or annular 
preventer,”41 which once activated can seal off the well. Pipe rams are the 
second line of defense that can stop the flow through the well.42 The 
final safe guards against the uncontrolled flow of oil through a well are 
the shear rams that can cut through the drill pipe and seal off the well.43 
II. Regulatory Oversight of Blowout Preventer Technology 
 The regulations applicable to oil exploration and production op-
erations in the Gulf of Mexico and other areas of the Outer Continen-
tal Shelf are found at 30 C.F.R. part 250, and were administered by 
MMS when the Deepwater Horizon spill occurred.44 Two aspects of the 
regulatory approach to pressure control are noteworthy. First, to pre-
vent a catastrophic loss of pressure control, the regulations require an 
operator to “use the best available and safest drilling technology.”45 
Second, operators must use blowout preventers to ensure pressure con-
trol.46 Consequently, given the MMS mandate to use blowout prevent-
ers, the agency considered such equipment as among the “best avail-
able drilling technology” vital to maintaining well pressure control.47 
 Because of this reliance on blowout preventers, one can question 
whether MMS failed to adequately regulate the one piece of technology 
relied upon in the industry as a last resort to shut down an out-of-
control well. Unfortunately, it appears that the heavy reliance on blow-
out preventers as essential fail-safe technology was misplaced, and this 
directly contributed to the magnitude of the Deepwater Horizon spill.48 
                                                                                                                      
40 See Borchardt, supra note 30, at 41 (“Massive pieces of equipment called blowout 
preventers are designed to close valves and use shear rams to seal the drill pipe and well 
casing to block oil and gas from escaping the wellbore. They are the third and final line of 
defense against a blowout.”). 
41 See Leffler et al., supra note 16, at 60. 
42 Id. 
43 Id.; see also Borchardt, supra note 30, at 41 (“[S]hear rams cut through and crush the 
pipe and then form a seal . . . . The ram blades also seal against each other forming a bar-
rier blocking fluid flow.”). 
44 30 C.F.R. pt. 250 (2010). 
45 Id. § 250.401(a). 
46 Id. § 250.440. 
47 See id. § 250.401(a), 250.440. 
48 See id.; BP Commission Report, supra note 12, at 114, 121. 
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Once the blowout preventer failed, there was no other readily available 
solution to stop the uncontrolled flow of oil into the Gulf of Mexico.49 
A. Prior Blowout Preventer Failures 
 When one considers the reliability questions that MMS, engineers, 
and others in the industry raised concerning blowout preventers over 
the years,50 it is shocking that this technology serves as the final fail-safe 
mechanism to control well pressure in an emergency. As a starting 
point in considering the questionable reliability of blowout preventer 
technology, we must realize that the Deepwater Horizon spill was not 
some unexpected, unanticipated, rare occurrence. It was an entirely 
foreseeable event. That is, the Deepwater Horizon was not the first time 
that a blowout preventer failed to stop a catastrophic flow of oil after 
pressure control was lost at a well in the Gulf of Mexico.51 
 In 1979, the Mexican national oil company PEMEX, while con-
ducting oil exploration activities at the Ixtoc I well, experienced pres-
sure control problems.52 Realizing the critical need to capture well con-
trol, the Ixtoc I operators activated the shear rams on the blowout 
preventer.53 But once activated, the rams failed to shear through the 
pipe and stem the flow of oil.54 Thus, one lesson from the Ixtoc I spill 
was that, when most needed, blowout preventers can utterly fail. 
 More recently, in 2009, there was a well blowout off the coast of 
Australia. The Montara spill raged for more than ten weeks before flow 
was stopped.55 Although this well was only in 250 feet of water,56 it fur-
                                                                                                                      
49 BP Commission Report, supra note 12, at 114. 
50 See David Izon et al., Minerals Mgmt. Serv., Absence of Fatalities in Blowouts Encouraging in 
MMS Study of OCS Incidents 1992–2006, Drilling Contractor, July/Aug. 2007, at 84, 84, 
available at http://www.drillingcontractor.org/dcpi/dc-julyaug07/DC_July07_MMSBlowouts.pdf. 
51 See Arne Jernelöv & Olof Lindén, Ixtoc I: A Case Study of the World’s Largest Oil Spill, 10 
Ambio 299, 299 (1981). 
52 Id. 
53 W. Eng’g Servs., Shear Ram Capabilities Study 3-4 (2004) [hereinafter Shear 
Ram Capabilities Study], available at http://www.boemre.gov/tarprojects/463/(463) West 
Engineering Final Report.pdf (“WEST researched known failures to shear and seal and 
located only the Ixtox 1 blowout and spill off of the Yucatan peninsula. Undoubtedly, there 
are more failures that were either not reported well or had minimal exposure. Not in-
cluded are the known failures to seal during pressure testing since these were repaired prior 
to the rams being used on the well.”). 
54 Id. 
55 Keith Bradsher, Relief Well Was Used to Halt Australian Spill, N.Y. Times, May 3, 2010, 
at A14. 
56 Id. 
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ther demonstrates the technical difficulties associated with capping a 
well even in relatively shallow waters. 
 If the Ixtoc I and Montara spills are representative of rare blowout 
events, perhaps then the reliance by MMS and industry on blowout pre-
venters as technology might be understandable. Well blowouts, however, 
are not unheard-of events. According to MMS data evaluating blowouts 
on the Outer Continental Shelf, between 1971 and 1991, eight-seven 
blowouts occurred.57 MMS also found that between 1992 and 2006, an-
other thirty-nine blowouts happened.58 While the data show that the 
number of blowouts decreased over the years, nonetheless, over the 
thirty-five year period studied by MMS there were a total of 126 blowouts 
on the Outer Continental Shelf. The data compiled from 1971 through 
1991, according to MMS authors, correlated to one blowout for every 
246 wells drilled,59 and between 1992 through 2006 the blowout rate was 
one blowout for every 387 wells drilled.60 Consequently, the potential 
for a well blowout is startlingly high since there are over 4000 wells in 
the Gulf of Mexico, and even more alarmingly, 700 of these are in waters 
deeper than 5000 feet.61 
B. MMS Research into and Knowledge of Unreliable Blowout Preventers 
 For years MMS has been concerned about the effectiveness of 
blowout preventers as the critical technology in the event well pressure 
was compromised. A decade before the Deepwater Horizon incident, 
MMS funded a study to evaluate blowout preventer reliability.62 The 
study examined a total of 117 failures associated with blowout prevent-
ers at eighty-three deepwater wells, and categorized fifty-seven percent 
of the failures as “safety critical failures.”63 
 In 2004, MMS retained WEST Engineering Services “to answer the 
question ‘Can a rig’s blowout preventer (BOP) equipment shear the 
pipe to be used in a given drilling program at the most demanding 
                                                                                                                      
57 Izon et al., supra note 50, at 84. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Mouawad & Meier, supra note 9. 
62 Per Holand, SINTEF, Reliability of Subsea BOP Systems for Deepwater Appli-
cation, Phase II DW 7 (1999), available at http://www.boemre.gov/tarprojects/319/319AA. 
pdf (summarizing a reliability study of blowout preventers funded by MMS and performed by 
Norwegian research group SINTEF). 
63 Id. at 85 (“All failures that occur in the BOP after the installation test are regarded 
as safety critical failures.”). 
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condition to be expected, and at what pressure?’”64 This was not simply 
a question of engineering curiosity, since “[t]he well control function 
of last resort is to shear pipe and secure the well with the sealing shear 
ram. As a result, failure to shear when executing this final option would 
be expected to result in a major safety and/or environmental event.”65 
 The 2004 WEST Engineering study pointed to improvements in 
drill pipe strength, coupled with the need to use larger, heavier pipe in 
deepwater drilling, which together “adversely affect[] the ability of a 
given ram BOP to successfully shear and seal the pipe in use.”66 This 
concern was more than a theoretical possibility because “WEST is cur-
rently aware of several failures to shear when conducting shear tests 
using the drill pipe that was to be used in the well.”67 
 Others had also raised concerns about the reliability of blowout 
preventers. In a paper presented at the 2003 Offshore Technology 
Conference, the authors noted that “[f]loating drilling rig downtime 
due to poor BOP reliability is a common and very costly issue confront-
ing all offshore drilling contractors.”68 
 Blowout preventer unreliability has not escaped scrutiny in the 
Deepwater Horizon congressional investigations. One congressional 
committee’s investigation noted that “in numerous cases, blowout pre-
venters have failed to operate, often with catastrophic consequences. 
The blowout preventer installed on the Macondo well failed to control 
the blowout.”69 
 Not only did at least two studies conducted on behalf of MMS raise 
serious reliability questions concerning blowout preventer technology, 
but the agency also warned the offshore oil exploration and production 
industry about another shortcoming of blowout preventers—the inabil-
ity to operate a blowout preventer in the event that primary control is 
lost.70 In March 2000, MMS issued a notice advising lessees that “[t]he 
MMS considers a backup BOP actuation system to be an essential com-
                                                                                                                      
64 Shear Ram Capabilities Study, supra note 53, at 1-1. 
65 Id. at 3-1 (emphasis added). 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Earl Shanks et al., Deepwater BOP Control Systems—A Look at Reliability 
Issues 2 (2003), available at http://media.mcclatchydc.com/static/pdf/Les-oilspill-ABSC.pdf. 
69 Legislation to Respond to the BP Oil Spill and Prevent Future Oil Well Blowouts: Hearing Before 
the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 111th Cong. 6 (2010) (Memorandum by Rep. Henry A. 
Waxman, Chairman, H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, and Rep. Joe Barton, Member, H. 
Comm. on Energy & Commerce). 
70 See generally Minerals Mgmt. Serv., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, MMS Safety Alert 
No. 186: Accidental Disconnect of Marine Drilling Riser (2000), available at http:// 
www.eenews.net/public/25/15454/features/documents/2010/05/04/document_gw_03.pdf. 
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ponent of a deepwater drilling system and, therefore, expects OCS op-
erators to have reliable back-up systems for actuating the BOP.”71 
 In sum, there were several red flags about the unreliability of 
blowout preventers. Nonetheless, they remain the fail-safe device of last 
resort required by regulation, and the failure of one played a major 
role in the Deepwater Horizon spill.72 
III. The Regulatory Response 
 Among the regulatory steps taken after the spill was a six-month 
moratorium on deepwater drilling activities until November 30, 2010.73 
Despite the legitimate concerns raised about the ability to conduct 
deepwater drilling in a safe and environmentally responsible manner, 
the moratorium was controversial and ultimately was enjoined.74 A sec-
ond moratorium was issued shortly thereafter. It, too, was challenged in 
federal court. Before the court could rule on its validity, however, the 
second ban was lifted.75 
 MMS imposed new obligations upon deepwater drill rig operators 
to reduce the long-term risks associated with deepwater drilling, in par-
ticular technology-related regulations.76 These regulations specifically 
targeted blowout preventers. In sum, these new regulations include: a 
requirement to certify compliance with existing regulations, signed by 
the operator’s chief executive officer;77 submission of detailed informa-
tion about blowout preventers in use;78 retention of blowout preventer 
records;79 third-party verification of blowout preventer fitness;80 and 
the requirement to have in place redundant control mechanisms.81 
                                                                                                                     
 Similar to the first moratorium, the validity of these new regulations 
was challenged. The same judge who enjoined the first moratorium 
found that the new drilling safety obligations issued by the Bureau of 
 
71 Id. 
72 See 30 C.F.R. § 250.440 (2010); BP Commission Report, supra note 12, at 114, 121. 
73 See Ensco Offshore Co. v. Salazar, No. 10-1941, 2010 WL 4116892, at *1 (E.D. La. 
Oct. 19, 2010). 
74 See id. at *2. 
75 See id. 
76 Minerals Mgmt. Serv., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, NTL No. 2010-N05: Na-
tional Notice to Lessees and Operators of Federal Oil and Gas Leases, Outer 
Continental Shelf (OCS)—Increased Safety Measures for Energy Development 
on the OCS 1 (2010) [hereinafter MMS Increased Safety Measures]. 
77 Id. at 2. 
78 Id. at 2–3. 
79 Id. at 4. 
80 Id. at 3. 
81 Id. at 4–5. 
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Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE) 
were invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act.82 
 Perhaps the court’s invalidation of the safety alert requirements 
will have little practical effect on BOEMRE’s efforts to impose height-
ened regulation over deepwater drilling activities. Shortly before the 
court rejected the new regulations, BOEMRE published an interim fi-
nal rule that incorporated most of the safety alert requirements,83 and 
it became effective upon publication.84 
 The need to adopt what appear to be such basic common sense 
regulations, essentially reminders to industry of the need to properly 
maintain and operate blowout preventers, is further troubling evidence 
of MMS’s failure to adequately regulate technology. This is especially 
disconcerting given the critical importance of blowout preventers as the 
last-in-line, fail-safe mechanism if well control is lost thousands of feet 
beneath the ocean’s surface. That BOEMRE found it necessary to ob-
tain information about precisely what blowout preventers are in use is 
equally troubling. It reflects a past lack of robust oversight concerning 
the inherently risky activity of deepwater drilling, because it is strongly 
suggestive of agency ignorance about exactly what blowout preventers 
are in use to stop a catastrophic flow of oil from a runaway well. 
 In another post-Deepwater Horizon regulatory development, 
which serves as another example of less-than-diligent regulatory over-
sight, BOEMRE published a final rule requiring deepwater drill rig op-
erators to adopt Safety and Environmental Management Systems 
(SEMS).85 In promulgating this new directive, BOEMRE asserted that 
“[t]he ultimate goal of SEMS is to promote safety and environmental 
protection during OCS activities. The protection of human life and the 
environment are the top priorities and objectives of this rule.”86 
 These are certainly laudable and important regulatory goals, but 
when one considers the procedural history of this new rule, it raises 
additional concerns about the vigor with which MMS regulated deep-
                                                                                                                      
82 MMS Increased Safety Measures, supra note 76, at 4–5. 
83 Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf—Increased 
Safety Measures for Energy Development on the Outer Continental Shelf; Final Rule, 75 
Fed. Reg. 63,345, 63,346 (Oct. 14, 2010) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250). With the 
exception of one-time requirements, “[t]his rule incorporates specific details included in 
2010-N05 by codifying these into regulations.” Id. 
84 Id. at 63,346. 
85 Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf—Safety and 
Environmental Management Systems; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,609, 63,610 (Oct. 15, 
2010) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250). 
86 Id. at 63,644. 
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water drilling activities. MMS contemplated the need to improve safety 
and enhance environmental protection of deepwater drilling in 2006, 
years before the Deepwater Horizon spill occurred.87 It then took sev-
eral years for MMS to publish a proposed rule focusing on reducing the 
potential adverse safety and environmental aspects of deepwater drill-
ing.88 The impetus for the proposed rule was an evaluation of more 
than 1400 incidents that occurred during exploration and production 
activities on the Outer Continental Shelf, including forty-one fatalities 
and ten instances where well control was lost.89 Despite the significant 
safety and environmental concerns that served as the catalyst for the 
advanced notice of proposed rulemaking and proposed rule, no final 
rule came forth until almost six months after the Deepwater Horizon 
disaster resulted in eleven deaths, numerous injuries, and spewed mil-
lions of gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico.90 
 Another federal regulatory development, aimed at the heart of 
MMS, was the decision to split it into three separate bureaus.91 The new 
structure included BOEMRE, which would assume oversight of Outer 
Continental Shelf energy resources; the Bureau of Safety and Environ-
mental Enforcement, responsible for safety and enforcement; and the 
Bureau of Natural Resources Revenue, which assumed responsibility for 
royalties.92 
 The restructuring of MMS indicated a realization that the single 
agency approach suffered from insurmountable problems that ren-
dered MMS incapable of effectively regulating the oil and gas indus-
                                                                                                                      
87 Oil and Gas and Sulphur in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)—Safety and Envi-
ronmental Management Systems; Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 71 Fed. Reg. 
29,277, 29,277 (proposed May 22, 2006) (to be codified 30 C.F.R. pt. 250). 
88 See Safety and Environmental Management Systems for Outer Continental Shelf Oil 
and Gas Operations, 74 Fed. Reg. 28,639, 28,639 (proposed June 17, 2009) (to be codified 
at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250). 
89 Id. at 28,642. 
90 See Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf—Safety and 
Environmental Management Systems, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,610; BP Commission Report, 
supra note 12, at vi. 
91 U.S. Sec’y of the Interior, Order No. 3299, Establishment of the Bureau of Ocean En-
ergy Management, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, and the Office of 
Natural Resources Revenue (May 19, 2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/deepwaterhori-
zon/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=32475; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the 
Interior, Salazar Divides MMS’s Three Conflicting Missions (May 19, 2010), available at http:// 
www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Divides-MMSs-Three-Conflicting-Missions.cfm#. 
92 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 91. 
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try.93 The agency was entirely too cozy with the industry that it was sup-
posed to oversee,94 and also faced an inherent major conflict that pre-
vented it from serving as a robust and feared regulatory agency.95 This 
conflict arose from the dual role that the agency served when regulat-
ing the oil and gas industry.96 On the one hand, MMS was responsible 
for enforcing the regulations governing oil and gas operations in the 
Outer Continental Shelf.97 On the other hand, MMS was also responsi-
ble for the leasing program that authorizes oil and gas production ac-
tivities to occur in federal waters.98 
 The importance of this latter function of the now defunct MMS— 
auctioning off the rights to search for and produce oil and gas discov-
ered in federal waters—is significant. It was a lucrative aspect of MMS, 
reportedly only exceeded by the Internal Revenue Service as a revenue 
generating arm of the federal government.99 This duality was at the 
nub of the agency’s conflicting role; regulate an industry engaged in a 
highly risky activity, but not with such a heavy hand as to adversely im-
pact the revenue stream associated with the agency’s multibillion dollar 
offshore drilling lease and royalty program. This required a delicate 
balancing act that perhaps no single agency could perform, so what was 
once a single agency is now three bureaus.100 
IV. Will Interior’s Efforts Avert Another Deepwater Disaster? 
 Is this new approach adequate to dramatically reduce the risk of 
another deepwater spill? This is literally a multibillion dollar, life-or-
death question, given the devastating consequences that a blowout can 
                                                                                                                      
93 See id. (“The Minerals Management Service has three distinct and conflicting mis-
sions that—for the benefit of effective enforcement, energy development, and revenue 
collection—must be divided.”). 
94 See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin & Scott Higham, How the Mineral Management Service’s Partner-
ship With Industry Led to Failure, Wash. Post (Aug. 24, 2010, 10:14 PM), http://www.washing- 
tonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/24/AR2010082406754_pf.html. 
95 Id. (“The Minerals Management Service . . . created in 1982 would not only lease tracts 
for exploration and collect the government’s share of oil and gas revenue, it would also regu-
late the industry. That built-in conflict would hamstring the agency for decades.”). 
96 See Kristina Alexander, Cong. Research Serv., R41265, The 2010 Oil Spill: The 
Minerals Management Service (MMS) and the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA) 1 (2010). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 4. 
99 Les Blumenthal & Erica Bolstad, U.S. Agency Let Oil Industry Write Offshore Drilling 
Rules, McClatchy Newspapers, May 10, 2010, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/05/ 
10/93859/us-agency-lets-oil-industry-write.html. (“The MMS generates more revenue for 
the federal Treasury than any other agency except the Internal Revenue Service.”). 
100 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 91. 
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cause to human life and the environment. There are several reasons for 
skepticism that another catastrophic deepwater spill will be prevented 
by the new regulatory regime. 
 First, there is the sheer technical complexity of the equipment in-
volved in deepwater drilling.101 This injects increased opportunities for 
equipment failures and malfunctions that can have devastating conse-
quences, as amply illustrated by the Deepwater Horizon disaster. The 
technical complexity of the equipment required for drilling and ex-
tracting oil from miles beneath the surface of the ocean further in-
creases the possibilities for human error, and when coupled with less-
than-reliable “fail-safe” devices, another massive spill is just a new well 
away from occurring. 
 It may even be that the new requirements imposed by BOEMRE in 
response to the Deepwater Horizon spill will further increase the com-
plexity of the equipment used in deepwater drilling by adding layers of 
redundancies.102 Thus, the very regulations that designed to avert fu-
ture spills could have the perverse effect of increasing the likelihood of 
another disaster in the deep. 
 Then there is the environment where this incredibly complex 
technology is employed. To describe it as harsh grossly understates the 
conditions that deepwater drilling technology must withstand. Deepwa-
ter is an environment of extreme pressures and extreme temperatures. 
The oil can be hundreds of degrees Fahrenheit and the water close to 
freezing.103 The water pressure can be literally crushing.104 This ex-
treme environment only adds to the stresses and strains on the equip-
ment, and increases the risk of failure.105 
 A second overall concern is the frequency with which blowouts 
occur.106 Recall that according to an evaluation of blowouts that oc-
curred between 1992 and 2006, MMS determined that blowouts occur 
                                                                                                                      
101 See Mouawad & Meier, supra note 9 (referring to experts who opined that the risks 
associated with deepwater drilling “do not directly increase with greater depth, . . . [b]ut 
they do rise as exploration and production rigs become more complex and more re-
mote”). 
102 See Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf—Increased 
Safety Measures for Energy Development on the Outer Continental Shelf, 75 Fed. Reg. 
63,346, 63,348 (Oct. 14, 2010) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250) (listing additional pro-
posed regulatory safeguards). 
103 See Little, supra note 23, at 120 (“When the boiling-hot oil hits the freezing-cold wa-
ter, it could solidify and block the flow, rupturing the pipes.”). 
104 See id. at 118. 
105 See id. at 120. 
106 See Izon et al., supra note 50, at 84. 
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on average once for every several hundred wells drilled.107 To put that 
ratio into perspective, consider that almost 4000 wells exist in the Gulf 
of Mexico,108 and more are on their way as oil exploration and produc-
tion fans out into deeper and deeper waters. Thus, at least ten wells in 
operation now are expected to experience a blowout, creating the like-
lihood for more blowouts to occur in the future. 
 Third, the critical equipment problems that came to light as a re-
sult of the Deepwater Horizon spill are indicative of industry-wide prob-
lems.109 In fact, the blowout preventers that were employed during the 
relief well, drilled to stop the flow from the Macondo well, experienced 
multiple failures.110 The multiple failures of the blowout preventers dur-
ing such a critical emergency operation, concluded BOEMRE, “raise red 
flags as to the reliability of BOPs to adequately safeguard the lives of 
workers and protect the environment from oil spills in response to a 
large blowout.”111 
 Fourth, one can legitimately question whether BOEMRE and the 
other bureaus created in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon spill 
can truly serve as independent regulators of the oil and gas industry. 
One reason this question still lingers, even after MMS was dismantled, 
is because of BOEMRE’s continuing practice of adopting wholesale 
American Petroleum Institute (API) standards as regulatory require-
ments.112 This means that an influential industry trade association con-
tinues to loom large in the regulation of deepwater drilling. As a recent 
post-Deepwater Horizon example, one only need look at the SEMS re-
quirement adopted by BOEMRE in October 2010.113 Publication of the 
final SEMS rule in the Federal Register proclaimed that “[t]his rule-
making will incorporate in its entirety and make mandatory the Ameri-
can Petroleum Institute’s Recommended Practice 75, Development of a 
Safety and Environmental Management Program for Offshore Opera-
                                                                                                                      
107 Id. 
108 Mouawad & Meier, supra note 9. 
109 See Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf—Increased 
Safety Measures for Energy Development on the Outer Continental Shelf, 75 Fed. Reg. 
63,346, 63,355 (Oct. 14, 2010) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250) (“Circumstances sug-
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OCS, it is unlikely that the problems are unique to the Deepwater Horizon and BP’s Ma-
condo well.”). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 See, e.g., id. at 63,351. 
113 Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf—Safety and 
Environmental Management Systems, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,610, 63,610 (Oct. 15, 2010) (to be 
codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250). 
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tions and Facilities . . . under the jurisdiction of BOEMRE.”114 This is 
not the only time that API standards have been adopted by the agency 
as industry-wide regulatory requirements. According to one article rais-
ing questions about this practice, MMS, and now BOEMRE, have 
adopted almost 100 API standards as regulatory requirements.115 
 This is not to suggest that regulatory agencies should not work 
closely with industry representatives to develop regulations. In fact, one 
approach to regulation, “negotiated rulemaking,” involves actively seek-
ing input from all stakeholders, including industry representatives, as a 
regulation methodology. In addition, one should not foreclose consid-
ering the expertise that industry can bring to bear in assisting regula-
tors with the development of complex regulations.116 However, when 
an agency has the well-deserved reputation for having ties too close to 
the industry it regulates,117 doubts about regulator independence will 
legitimately follow, particularly when there is a practice of adopting 
wholesale numerous industry trade association standards as regula-
tions.118 Heavy reliance upon trade association standards also leads to 
questions about regulatory agency expertise.119 
 The fifth, and perhaps most disconcerting reason to have doubts 
about the future effectiveness of the new deepwater regulatory regime 
involves the question of execution. That is, do the newly formed bu-
reaus have sufficient personnel, polices, and training in place to closely 
regulate industry as it engages in deepwater drilling and its attendant 
risks? Based on the findings of a specially appointed Safety Oversight 
Board,120 there are a number of ongoing agency difficulties of such 
                                                                                                                      
114 Id. 
115 See Blumenthal & Bolstad, supra note 99. 
116 See Outer Cont’l Shelf Safety Oversight Bd., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Re-
port to Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar 5, 26 (2010) [hereinafter Safety 
Oversight Board Report]. 
117 See Blumenthal & Bolstad, supra note 99 (quoting an environmental attorney de-
scribing the MMS as “a revolving door where officials slip back and forth between the gov-
ernment and the oil industry. That only adds to the perception that the federal agency is 
too close to the interests it regulates.”). 
118 See Safety Oversight Board Report, supra note 116, at 26. 
119 See id. (questioning whether BOEMRE has “sufficient staff with the requisite exper-
tise to review and vet standards that have been developed by industry group subject matter 
experts, such as the American Petroleum Institute (API), to determine the extent to which 
those standards should be used in developing regulations”). 
120 Creation of the Safety Oversight Board was one of the actions taken by Secretary 
Salazar in response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Id. at 1. The Safety Oversight Board 
was directed to, among other tasks, recommend ways to improve oversight of Outer Conti-
nental Shelf activities. Id. 
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magnitude that addressing them by merely reorganizing MMS into 
three separate bureaus is not likely to resolve them.121 
 One of the most fundamental functions of any regulatory agency is 
to review permit applications. Regulator review is important to confirm 
that a sought-after permit and the activities it authorizes comply with 
the underlying statutory and regulatory requirements. This critical 
function, however, is likely to remain impaired because of a lack of per-
sonnel. According to the Safety Oversight Board, there are simply not 
enough engineers at BOEMRE to review the thousands of permit ap-
plications to conduct drilling activities in the Gulf of Mexico.122 
 Another shortcoming incapable of resolution by reorganization 
alone has to do with inspections, which are also among the core func-
tions of a regulatory agency. In order to ensure that permitees are 
meeting their legal obligations on a consistent basis, routine inspec-
tions are among the most essential regulator activities. Furthermore, 
those conducting the inspections must have appropriate training and 
be apprised of the applicable statutes and regulations that underlie in-
spections and compliance determinations. A regulatory inspection 
program should also be random and unannounced if it is to maximize 
its effectiveness in evaluating compliance and deterring violations. In-
spections that do not regularly occur or that are announced undercut 
this important regulatory tool and will fail to detect and deter viola-
tions.123 If inspections uncover violations, then a critical part of any 
regulatory program is appropriate enforcement to punish violators, 
bring them into compliance, and deter future violations. 
 The inspection function of BOEMRE is compromised because of 
major shortcomings with each of the main components of an effective 
inspection and enforcement program outlined above. One problem, 
for instance, the Safety Oversight Board found was that BOEMRE “does 
not have a formal, bureau-wide compilation of rules, regulations, poli-
cies, or practices pertinent to inspections, nor does it have a compre-
hensive handbook addressing inspector roles and responsibilities.”124 
In addition, “unannounced inspections are rarely performed.”125 
                                                                                                                      
121 See id. at 4–5 (discussing agency difficulties). 
122 Id. at 6 (“With increasing workloads, [Gulf of Mexico] district offices do not have a 
sufficient number of engineers to efficiently and effectively conduct permit reviews.”). 
123 See Jeffrey F. Beatty & Susan S. Samuelson, Business Law and the Environ-
ment 92 ( Jack W. Calhoun et al. eds., 4th ed. 2007). 
124 Safety Oversight Board Report, supra note 116, at 8. 
125 Id. at 9. 
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 Lack of appropriate inspector training is another shortcoming ad-
versely impacting the effectiveness of BOEMRE as a regulatory agency, 
since it “does not have a formal training and certificate program for its 
inspectors.”126 In light of the breathtaking complexity involved in 
deepwater oil production activities, the lack of inspector training is very 
troubling. 
 The number of inspectors is yet another problem plaguing the 
BOEMRE offshore regulatory program. According to the Safety Over-
sight Board, there are approximately 3000 offshore facilities subject to 
BOEMRE jurisdiction in the Gulf of Mexico,127 but there are only fifty-
five inspectors.128 This means there are fifty-four facilities for every one 
inspector,129 which seems wholly inadequate when one considers the 
technical complexity associated with deepwater drilling and produc-
tion, and their inherent risks. 
 The lack of inspection personnel may explain, in part, why even 
after instances of noncompliance are found, few follow-up inspections 
result. In 2009 there were 2298 so-called instances of noncompliance; 
however, “only 50 follow-up inspections were conducted to ensure com-
pliance.”130 
 The penalties violators may face for noncompliance are another 
problem for BOEMRE. The maximum penalty for violations is $35,000 
per day, per violation.131 At first blush this may not seem an inconse-
quential sum, and is in line with the penalty amounts proscribed by 
other environmental statutes.132 As the Safety Oversight Board pointed 
out, however, even BOEMRE employees question whether, given the 
fact that “many operators pay between $500,000 and $1 million daily to 
run a facility, . . . a potential fine of no more than $35,000 per violation 
per day is an effective tool to deter violations.”133 
 Data considered by MMS supports the view that past enforcement 
against the offshore industry has not resulted in improved compliance. 
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130 Safety Oversight Board Report, supra note 116, at 18. 
131 See 43 U.S.C. § 1350(b) (2006); Outer Continental Shelf Civil Penalties, 75 Fed. 
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133 Safety Oversight Board Report, supra note 116, at 18. 
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In discussing the need to consider adoption of SEMS as a regulatory 
standard, MMS noted that from 2001 to 2007 it had issued approxi-
mately 150 instances of noncompliance to oil drilling operators per 
year.134 MMS concluded that such enforcement activity had little, if any, 
deterrent effect, because it led to “no discernable trend of improvement 
by industry over the past 7 years.”135 
V. Additional Measures to Consider 
 One lesson learned from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill is the 
regulations in place governing deepwater drilling are insufficient. Ad-
ditional measures are required to ensure that deepwater drilling is per-
formed as safely as is humanly possible, and in a manner that mini-
mizes adverse environmental impacts. The actions taken by BOEMRE 
to date are a step in the right direction. Alone, however, they are not 
enough to prevent the next Deepwater Horizon-magnitude oil spill 
from recurring. 
A. Increased Penalties 
 One way to incentivize the oil and gas industry to engage in deep-
water drilling as safely as humanly possible is to substantially bolster the 
sanctions that are available in the event that a spill does occur. To 
achieve this goal, in part, Congress should eliminate the liability cap 
associated with oil spills, which is now $75 million,136 unless gross neg-
ligence or willful misconduct is found.137 The current limit on liability, 
even with no limit on removal costs, is woefully inadequate for the 
harm that a massive spill like the Deepwater Horizon can cause. 
 Closely related to the liability cap is whether the per day, per viola-
tion, civil penalty that operators face for noncompliance is sufficient. 
The Safety Oversight Board concluded that the current amount, up to 
$35,000 per day, per violation, provides insufficient deterrent effect.138 
Therefore, it is clear that the amount should be dramatically increased. 
                                                                                                                      
134 See Safety and Environmental Management Systems for Outer Continental Shelf Oil 
and Gas Operations, 74 Fed. Reg. 28,639, 28,642 (proposed June 17, 2009) (codified at 30 
C.F.R. pt. 250). 
135 Id. 
136 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(3) (2006). 
137 Id. § 2704(c). 
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 A related financial deterrence mechanism that Congress can put 
in place is to greatly enhance the civil liability of responsible parties 
when gross negligence or willful misconduct is found. In order to deter 
and punish such conduct, it is not sufficient to rely on the common law 
punitive damages remedy. As the Exxon Valdez oil spill litigation vividly 
demonstrated, even if awarded, punitive damages are subject to dra-
matic reductions by the courts. There, the trial court imposed a $5 bil-
lion punitive damages award against Exxon for the massive Prince Wil-
liam Sound spill.139 Following multiple appeals, the Ninth Circuit 
reduced the punitive damages award to $2.5 billion,140 and later the 
Supreme Court further reduced it to just $500 million, a one-to-one 
ratio based on the compensatory damages.141 
 To avoid the morass of punitive damages resulting from recent Su-
preme Court decisions,142 Congress can look to the Comprehensive En-
vironmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and 
its treatment of recalcitrant Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs) who 
fail to comply with section 106 orders.143 CERCLA section 106 author-
izes the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to order PRPs to inves-
tigate and remediate a site contaminated with hazardous substances if 
an imminent and substantial endangerment to human health, welfare, 
or the environment exists.144 What makes the issuance of a section 106 
order such a potent EPA enforcement tool is that the failure to comply 
can result not only in large per day, per violation fines,145 but additional 
liability up to treble the amount incurred by the government in re-
sponding to the release of hazardous substances.146 A similar approach 
could be adopted by amending the Oil Pollution Act to impose, in addi-
tion to removal costs and natural resource damages,147 an express treble 
                                                                                                                      
139 In re The Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1082 (D. Alaska 2004), vacated 490 
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damages award based upon the total economic harm resulting from the 
oil spill148 where instances of gross negligence or willful misconduct are 
found. 
B. Increased Financial Assurances 
 Yet another financial mechanism that could become a routine 
condition of issuing drill permits for deepwater exploration and pro-
duction is to require the ultimate parent to sign as a guarantor for any 
damages that result from one of its subsidiary’s drilling activities.149 
One of the designated responsible parties for the Deepwater Horizon 
oil spill is BP Exploration and Production, Inc.,150 a subsidiary of BP 
North America, which is a wholly owned subsidiary of the London-
headquartered BP PLC.151 It remains to be seen whether BP Explora-
tion and Production, Inc. has the financial wherewithal to compensate 
for all the damages associated with the spill. It also remains to be seen 
whether the protection of the bankruptcy courts may be sought by BP 
Exploration and Production, Inc. as its total financial liability evolves.152 
 In the event the responsible party is unable to fully compensate for 
damages, the ultimate parent guarantee of BP PLC would serve as an 
alternative funding source to make certain that all corporate assets are 
available for compensation, and not hidden behind the shield of lim-
ited shareholder liability.153 Without such an ultimate parent guaran-
tee, the maximum extent of the assets available is confined to those of 
the subsidiary and not the parent.154 
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 On a related issue, currently under the Oil Pollution Act parties 
engaged in offshore drilling activities have to provide financial assur-
ances of up to $35,000,000.155 The current amount of financial assur-
ances is inadequate considering the damages wrought by the Deepwa-
ter Horizon spill and should be dramatically increased by Congress.156 
C. Increased Criminal Sanctions 
 To truly maximize deterrence and improve operator compliance, 
Congress could also increase the criminal sanctions associated with oil 
spills.157 In addition, the Department of Justice could aggressively use 
the responsible corporate officer doctrine in prosecuting major oil spill 
cases.158 If corporate officers faced the threat of prison as one of the 
consequences of an oil spill, they are much more likely to manage with 
a heightened concern for compliance, safety, and environmental pro-
tection. 
D. Improving the Regulatory Structure 
 Other necessary steps include addressing the structural deficien-
cies at BOEMRE. We cannot reasonably expect the agency, even in its 
restructured form, to effectively regulate the complexities associated 
with deepwater exploration and production without enough engineers 
to conduct even basic permit reviews.159 Similarly, we are asking too 
much of regulators to closely monitor offshore activities, including 
deepwater drilling, if personnel are not adequately trained and lack 
clear written guidelines. Further, we cannot expect effective agency 
regulation without a random and unannounced inspection regime. 
                                                                                                                      
155 33 U.S.C. § 2716(c)(1)(B). 
156 The National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill estimated that it 
could cost anywhere from $15 to $20 billion to restore the Gulf. BP Commission Report, 
supra note 12, at 210–11. Civil penalties under the Clean Water Act could be between $4.5 
to $20 billion depending on findings of negligence and the amount of oil that was dis-
charged. Id. According to the complaint filed on December 15, 2010 by the Justice De-
partment, “[t]he amount of damages and the extent of injuries sustained by the United 
States as a result of the Deepwater Horizon Spill are not yet fully known, but far exceed 
$75,000,000.” Complaint of the United States of America at 19, United States v. BP Explo-
ration & Prod. Inc., No. 2:10-cv-04536-CJB-SS (E.D. La. Dec. 15, 2010). 
157 See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (2006) (criminal sanctions provi-
sions under Clean Water Act). 
158 See, e.g., id. § 1319(c)(6) (defining a “person” under the Clean Water Act to include 
“any responsible corporate officer”). 
159 See Safety Oversight Board Report, supra note 116, at 6. 
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 Thus, steps must immediately be taken to address these and other 
deficiencies discussed in the Safety Oversight Board’s report. Without 
addressing these fundamental regulatory agency issues, no matter what 
new statutory or regulatory measures are enacted and regardless of 
what agency restructuring takes place, the actions of regulators and 
policymakers will not succeed in preventing another massive oil spill 
from future deepwater drilling activities. 
E. Improved Technology and Oil Spill Response 
 Lastly, since policymakers and industry continue to support deep-
water exploration and production activities, we must strive to have in 
place the best technology humanly possible. If we do not, future mas-
sive oil spills will result. One possible course of action is for BOEMRE 
to establish a special commission involving experts from the agency, 
law, academia, the engineering profession and, yes, the oil and gas in-
dustry, that would then collaborate on further evaluating and improv-
ing existing deepwater technology. Such an expert commission can also 
consider how other countries regulate deepwater drilling to see if there 
are indeed better regulatory regimes in place. 
 A particular focus of these experts should rest on the fundamen-
tals of well pressure control—the use of drilling mud and cement—as 
the primary methods of avoiding another Deepwater Horizon disas-
ter.160 Another focus of the experts must be on blowout preventers, 
given their critical function as a last resort fail-safe mechanism in the 
event pressure control is lost at a well. 
 This expert panel must also reassess the worst case scenario in the 
event well control is lost and the blowout preventer fails to stop the well 
from flowing. This would involve examining current oil spill response 
technologies and methods to seek improvements in the actions needed 
to combat an oil spill. To its credit, the oil and gas industry has already 
headed down this path by forming a joint industry task force to “iden-
tify best practices in offshore drilling operations and equipment.”161 
                                                                                                                      
160 See supra Part I.B. 
161 See Joint Indus. Task Force to Address Offshore Operating Procedures & 
Equip., White Paper: Recommendations for Improving Offshore Safety 1 (2010), avail-
able at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/DRAFTJITFRecommendations1. 
pdf. 
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Conclusion 
 Even after the several-months-long Deepwater Horizon oil spill, 
obtaining recoverable oil from deep beneath the ocean floor, in thou-
sands of feet of water, remains an important part of our nation’s energy 
policy. Among the confluence of factors that contributed to the Deep-
water Horizon human tragedy and environmental disaster was a failure 
to adequately regulate the risks associated with deepwater drilling 
technology. Admittedly, the federal government has taken certain ac-
tions in response to this unparalleled disaster, including revamping the 
regulatory agency responsible for permitting and oversight of deepwa-
ter drilling activities and adopting new regulations targeting oil and gas 
activities in the Gulf of Mexico. 
 There are legitimate reasons to doubt, however, whether the ac-
tions taken by the federal government are sufficient to dramatically re-
duce the risks of another catastrophic oil spill that will result in loss of 
life and untoward harm to the marine ecosystem. One reason to ques-
tion whether the federal government’s actions are adequate to reduce 
the risks inherent in deepwater drilling is because of the incredible 
complexity of the technology used in deepwater oil production. This is 
particularly troublesome when one contemplates the extraordinarily 
harsh conditions that the technology faces in deepwater. Further, dis-
mantling MMS and creating BOEMRE, as its replacement agency, ap-
pears to have done little to address the lack of resources that are critical 
for any agency to serve in a robust regulatory capacity. A final reason to 
be less than sanguine about the future effectiveness of the response to 
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill is the reliance on blowout preventers as 
the fail-safe mechanism of last resort in the event pressure control is 
lost at a well in thousands of feet of water. As amply demonstrated by 
the Deepwater Horizon, blowout preventers fail at an alarmingly high 
rate; yet presently by regulation they are the technological fail-safe de-
vice of last resort for the industry. 
 The Deepwater Horizon vividly illustrated to regulators, industry 
representatives, and members of the public a tragic lesson about the 
terrible consequences associated with deepwater oil drilling. Never-
theless, despite this tragic lesson, we still remain only one well away 
from another unfortunate disaster in the deep unless additional steps 
are taken by regulators and industry. 
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